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Judicial Review: Political Reality and
Legislative Purpose: The Supreme Court's
Supervision of Congressional Investigations
Martin Shapiro*
Mr. Shapiro takes to task the Supreme Court's requirement of
"legislative purpose" of congressional investigating committees and the
correlative presumption in favor of such purpose. Besides being based
on the false view that the three branches of our Government are totally
separate in function, these doctrines distort the Court's traditionalrole
as the balancing power between individual freedom and the interests
of society. After analyzing pertinent decisions, the author advances
several methods by which the Court can free itself of these limitations.
I. INTRODUCMON
The Supreme Court has long claimed the power to exercise judicial
review over the investigatory activities of Congress. The most severe
limitation the Court has imposed is the requirement of legislative purpose.
Investigations must be conducted for the purpose of aiding Congress in
making the laws. But the Court has also introduced the doctrine of
presumption of legislative purpose. The Justices will presume that the
investigating committee and the Congress which authorized it had a
legislative purpose in pursuing the inquiry.
It will be argued here that these two doctrines are completely interdependent; once legislative purpose was required, presumption was bound
to follow. It will also be argued that the two taken together are so in
conflict with political reality that they cut the Court off from any effective
supervision of actual investigative practice. Therefore, a new approach is
suggested which would abandon the purpose and presumption doctrines in
favor of a judicial acknowledgment of the real purposes and functions of
congressional inquiries. Such an approach would allow the Supreme Court
to regain contact with the practical world of politics and thus permit it to
impose more than theoretical constitutional limitations on investigations,
particularly on those which infringe upon first amendment freedoms.
II. TBm PBESUMPTION OF LEGISLATIVE PURPoSE
The notion of legislative purpose first became significant in Kilbourn v.
Thompson.' The investigation in question was aimed at determining the
*Instructor, Department of Government, Harvard University.

1. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
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causes of the failure of Jay Cooke's financial house. The Court's reasoning
was simple, or rather simplistic, enough. The Constitution "has blocked
out with singular precision, and in bold lines, in its three primary articles,
the allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and judicial departments ....2 Inquiry into the propriety of private business transactions
was clearly judicial since it was designed to establish wrongdoing by
individuals.3 And such investigations "could result in no valid legislation
on the subject to which the inquiry referred."4 Thus the investigation was
judicial rather than legislative in character and, therefore, exceeded the
powers of the House of Representatives. By insisting that Congress did
not have "the general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of
the citizen,"5 examining the committee's authorizing resolution for signs of
congressional intent, and disapproving an investigation which lacked legislative purpose, Kilbourn set the tone for the whole subsequent body of
constitutional litigation on congressional inquiries.
But if we are to speak of legislative purpose with some hope of actual
communication, it is vital to know whether "legislative" means pertaining
to lawmaking or pertaining to the legislature, i.e., Congress. In the one
instance "legislative purpose" means for the purpose of making law, in the
other, for any purpose of Congress, lawmaking or otherwise. But according to Justice Miller, all Washington is divided into three parts, a legislative which makes laws, an executive which administers them and a judiciary
which decides individual cases under them. The three are clearly defined
and mutually exclusive. Thus, if the Kilbourn investigation is judicial,
ipso facto, it is not legislative, and if not legislative, not for Congress. Or,
looked at another way, if the investigation is not concerned with making
laws, it is not legislative, if it is not legislative it must be executive or
judicial. Therefore, it must be for the President or the courts, not for
Congress. Justice Miller's constitutional theories made it unnecessary for
him to define precisely the word "legislative" because for him the only
legitimate purpose of Congress was the purpose of making law. Thus
Kilboum v. Thompson tended to obscure the problem of legislative purpose
at the same time that it introduced the doctrine.
The next important case was McCrain v. Daugherty.6 While the investigation at issue concerned malfeasance in the Justice Department, Daugherty
was a private citizen. The committee had evinced a desire to ask him
about private banking transactions. 7 Nor did any mention of intended
2. Id. at 191.
3. Id. at 193.

4. Id. at 195.
5. Id. at 190.

6. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).

7. Dimock, CongressionalInvestigation Committees, 47 JoHN HoxMiNs UNWv. STUDIS
IN HMsToxcuAL & PoxrcAL ScIEcE 9, 138 (1929).
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legislation appear in the authorizing resolution which was aimed at verifying the failure of the Attorney General to perform his sworn duties. Obviously strict observance of the Kilbourn. precedent might have put the
investigation in danger. The Court did not want to do that. There had
been a barrage of criticism directed against the restraints which Kilbourn
had placed on congressional inquiries.8 This particular investigation concerned Teapot Dome and had aroused tremendous public reaction. And
it primarily involved not one part of government examining private citizen
Daugherty, but one part of government examining another.
The simplest road for the Court would have been to admit that Congress
had always investigated not only for the purpose of making laws, but
for many other purposes, among them the exposure of governmental wrongdoings of concern to the nation. Unfortunately, the Court debarred itself
from this politically realistic approach. For, in constructing an afirmative
answer to the question of whether Congress had any investigatory power
at all, 9 it adopted the simplistic constitutional rhetoric of Kilbourn. Congress had the power to investigate because it "is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function .... A legislative body cannot

legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change .... "10
By relying on this notion of Congress as creating the law, the whole law
and nothing but the law, Justice Van Devanter made it impossible to
approve the investigation on the grounds that it was in support of a legitimate administrative, rather than lawmaking, function of Congress.
But Justice Van Devanter was unable to find any declaration of legislative purpose (i.e., lawmaking purpose) in the authorizing resolution,
not surprising since none was intended. Therefore, he was driven to
argue that if the subject matter was appropriate for investigation, a
presumption of legislative purpose was established even though no such
purpose was stated in the authorizing resolution. "An express avowal of
the object would have been better; but in view of the particularsubject
matter was not indispensable.""1 In short, where no legislative purpose was
evident, the Court would by presumption inject the purpose necessary to
meet its self-invented requirement. Then the "particular subject matter,"
i.e., that Congress might have passed laws in this area if it had had a mind
to, is dragged in to support the presumption which was necessary in the
first place because the Congress obviously had not had a mind to. The
8. See Landis, ConstitutionalLimitations on the CongressionalPowers of Investigation,
40 HAuv. L. REv. 153 (1926); Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies To Punish for
Contempt, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1926); Frankfurter, Hands Off the Investigations, 38
Nmv RE'un uc 329 (1924).
9. The issue had been deliberately left open in Kilbourn.
10. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174-75 (1927).
11. Id. at 178. (Emphasis added.)
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:presumption doctrine represents an admission by Van Devanter that if
he really applied the requirement of legislative purpose suggested in
Kilbourn, and confirmed in his own opinion, he would be forced to strike
-down an investigation which seemed legitimate to the Congress, the
public and somehow to the Court itself.
Kilbourn and McGrain had only dealt with the question of whether
'Congress as a whole had a legislative purpose in authorizing a given
investigation. In Sinclair v. United States'2 a contumacious witness challenged the legislative purpose, not of Congress in establishing an investigating committee, but of the committee in asking certain questions. Since
this investigation was also part of the Teapot Dome affair, like McGrain
its most obvious features were oversight of administrative activity and
public exposure of malfeasance. Therefore, in order to fit it in neatly under
the legislative purpose concept, the Court was forced to resort again to the
presumption approach. Justice Butler picked up the hint in McGrain
that an express avowal of purpose in the authorizing resolution was
desirable. He held that if the subject matter was appropriate, and the
resolution stated a legislative purpose, a presumption of purpose would be
established.
Indeed it would, for Congress, which had met the McGrain test perfectly by picking a subject matter already declared appropriate by Justice
Van Devanter and specifically stating a legislative purpose in its authorizing
resolution. But why should these two factors establish a presumption for
a committee of Congress. Sinclair really fails to distinguish between
Congress and its committees and borrows for the latter a doctrine of
presumption established for the former. We are now two steps removed
from reality. And the second step, like the first, is taken because the Court,
faced with investigatory activity which it feels legitimate but which does
not meet its nothing but the law vision of Congress, must somehow drag
lawmaking in by the back door.
United States v. Bryan 3 took a third step by presuming the appropriatemess of the subject matter and thus requiring only a declaration of purpose
in the authorizing resolution. Bryan makes a nice one-two combination
with McGrain. If the subject matter in any way suggests lawmaking but
the resolution does not, play subject matter. If the subject matter does not
but the resolution does, play resolution. The final step was taken in United
States v. Josephson14 where the presumption of committee purpose was
made almost completely irrebuttable. A declaration of purpose in the
12. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
13. 72 F. Supp. 58 (D.D.C. 1947), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 174 F.2d
525 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 323 (1950). The court of
appeals did not consider the issue and the Supreme Court specifically refused to
-decide this and other questions not passed on by the court of appeals.
14. 165 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
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authorizing resolution was held to establish conclusively such purpose
"regardless of any statement by the Committee or its members intimating
to the contrary." Here the combination is with Sinclair. Disregard any
distinction between Congress and committee so that the presumption worn
by one will clothe the other. And when the defendant bumptiously calls
your attention to the distinction, castigate his rudeness by refusing to give
any weight to evidence countering the presumption.
A weakening in the presumption doctrine was heralded by Judge
Edgerton's dissenting opinion in Barslcy v. United States5 which suggested
that the courts should examine the actual purposes of Congress and its
committees. 16 A further sign that the courts might be abandoning their
uncritical acceptance of legislative purpose was the failure of Justice
Frankfurter in United States v. Rumely'7 to accept the government's
contention that an investigation of certain book sales had a valid legislative
purpose because it was necessary to determine whether such sales constituted a device for avoiding the provisions of the Lobbying Act of
1946.18 And United States v. Icardi19 was the first case since Kilbourn
which directly held that an investigation lacked legislative purpose. It ruled
that the presumption of innocence due the defendant outweighed the
presumption of legislative purpose. Therefore, the government had to
prove legislative purpose. Much dissatisfaction with the presumption of
legislative purpose was also evidenced in Justice Warren's opinion in
Watkins v. United States.20 Nevertheless, the cycle of cases from Watkins
through Barenblatt v. United States2l to Wilkinson v. United State 2 2 and
Braden v. United States,23 which will be discussed at some length below,
continued not only to demand legislative purpose, but returned to the
presumption that it existed in the face of an increasingly general conviction that the investigating committees concerned are not primarily
motivated by the desire to make law.
Although the presumption doctrine seems to have been occasionally
weakened, the courts continue to cling to the requirement of legislative
purpose. They are then driven back willy-nilly to the presumption doctrine
in one form or another in order to overcome the difficulties most investigations have in living up to that requirement. Since these difficulties
constantly arise, it seems obvious that there must be some deviation between
15. 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
16. Id. at 252.
17. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
18. 60 Stat. 839, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1958).
19. 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956).
20. 354 U.S. 178 (1957). But the Chief Justice does support the requirement of
legislative purpose. Id. at 199; Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955).
21. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
22. 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
23. 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
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the Supreme Court's constitutional theory and the realities of American
'political practice. It is to those realities that we now turn.
III. THE

REALrr

A. The Division of Powers
We have seen that underlying the doctrine of legislative purpose is
the vision of a tripartite government in which each branch does one
thing and one thing only; the Congress makes law, the executive administers
it, and the courts judge individual cases under it. That this vision is
fundamentally incorrect is hardly a new or startling revelation. The
judicial function is, for instance, certainly not the monopoly of the judicial
branch. Even leaving aside the independent regulatory commissions and
their mixed bag of quasi-powers, it has been recognized for many years
that executive agencies constantly perform judicial tasks.2 4 And it is
congressional investigations themselves which, when realistically examined,
show the judicial functions of Congress.25
Nor is the administrative process left entirely in the hands of the
executive. In spite of a long train of self-limiting ordinances, the federal
courts still exercise a wide supervision over federal administration if for
no other reason than that judicial and administrative functions are so
inextricably mixed in the executive branch that the courts cannot supervise
one without supervising the other.26 The Congress has always participated
intimately in the administrative process through its power to specify the
minutest details of administrative organization and expenditure.2 7 The
increasingly popular legislative veto device has allowed Congress to reserve
to itself the final say on such administrative questions as where a specific
barracks will be built or to whom a given piece of surplus property will be
sold.2 And through the committee-bureau relationship, one of the most
intimate in Washington, congressional committees are constantly involved
in the everyday business of the executive departments. 29 Here again investigations themselves have been one of Congress' major administrative
tools.30
24. See CHAmERLA., DOWLiNG
ADmINISTnATVE AGENCIES (1942).

25. See pp. 545-46 infra.

& HAYS,

THE JuDim&L FUrcnoN

IN FEDERAL

26. See the series of articles by Jaffe: 67 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1954); 69 tAnv. L.
239 (1955); 69 HA~v. L. REv. 1020 (1956); 70 IhAv. L. REV. 953 (1957).
27. See WILLouGmY, PINIcn'IES OF PtmLic ADMINISTRATION 9-35 (1927).
28. See Cooper, The Legislative Veto: Its Promise and Its Perils, 7 PUBLIC POLICY
128 (1957); Schauffer, The Legislative Veto Revisited, 8 PuBLIc PoLIcY 296 (1958).
29. See GnuF-T=H, CONGRESS, ITS CONTEmoRAnx ROLE 50, 59, 158 (3d ed.
1961); FREEfAN, THE POLrTICAL PROCESS: ExEcUTwE BUREAu-LEGISLATIVE CoA1MrTrE RELATIONS (1955).
30. see pp. 542-44 infra.

REv.
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Finally, the executive branch has for many years been the source of the
bulk of legislation eventually passed by Congress. No modem President
is without his legislative program for whose passage the electorate increasingly holds him, not Congress, responsible. A recent commentator awards
the President the title of "Chief Legislator."3 1 Writings on the Presidency
continually stress the role of the executive in the lawmaking process. 32 And
the debate over "judicial modesty" and the democractic propriety of
judicial review rests on the realization that the Supreme Court's power to
declare acts of Congress unconstitutional projects the judiciary as well as
the Presidency into the lawmaking sphere.3
Indeed the increasing tendency of legislative bodies to lose parts of
their lawmaking functions, particularly to the executive, has led one of the
most respected students of constitutional government to argue that
the political function of representative assemblies today is not so much the
initiation of legislation as the carrying on of popular education and propaganda
and the integration and co-ordination of conflicting interests and viewpoints.3 4

But this emphasis on the propaganda and public education functions of
legislative chambers is not simply a reflection of the decline in the other
powers of such bodies. Indeed, emphasis on direct congressional contact
with the public is part of Congress' struggle to maintain its other powers
against executive encroachment. Perhaps the greatest power of the modem
President is his position in the public eye. His capacity for making news,
his access to the mass media and consequent opportunity to claim for
himself the role of "Voice of the People,"3 5 have constantly enhanced his
power over Congress in both legislative and administrative matters. In
this context, Congress' ability to exercise any of its traditional functions
becomes increasingly dependent on its own ability to attract the public
eye and build up a stock of public attention to counterbalance that of the
President.
In a nation in which mass public support has increasingly become the
coin of the political market place, the constitutional balance of power
between the three great divisions of government is more and more dependent on the ability of each to recruit general support. No matter how
one visualizes the parceling out of the lawmaking, administrative and
judicial functions, it is obvious that the Constitution intended that each
branch have a self-preservation function, for the government of the founding fathers was predicated on the continuous existence and at least semi31. See RossrrEn, TuR AEzPcAC PE EsnENcY 28 (rev. ed. 1960).
32. See BnnmXm, Tkr Mx iN m WH=r HousE 161-84 (1958); CoRwIN, ThE
PREsmENT, OFFIcE AND PowERs 263 (1957); NEUSTADT, PRmsmENTru PowER 5-6,
103 (1960).
33. See HANDw, THE Bi.L OF IMGrrs 39 (1958).
34. FRnmRc, CoNsrrtrroNAr GovERNamRrr AND DEmocRAcY 297 (rev. ed. 1950).
35. Rossiter, op. cit. supra note 31, at 32.
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independence of the three component parts. Today, therefore, all three
branches, whatever their other functions, have the constitutionally legitimate function of attracting public attention and gaining public support.
The actual division of powers in Washington today, then, is not one in
which each branch is solely concerned with the exercise of a monopoly in
one governmental commodity. All three branches legislate, administer and
judge. And all three, as the price of continued effectiveness, must strive
to sell themselves to the electorate.
B. CongressionalInvestigations
The Supreme Court has argued that since the sole purpose of the
legislature is lawmaking, the function of legislative investigations must be
to gather information for the purpose of making law. Once it has been
shown that Congress has several purposes other than lawmaking, it should
be evident by the same reasoning that investigations may also have several
functions. In fact, investigation is a multi-purpose congressional tool. The
aims of any given investigation are usually so interwoven that the examination of various distinct purposes is more analytically convenient than
politically realistic. 36
A catalogue of such purposes may begin with the widely recognized
role of investigations as a means of congressional participation in and
supervision of the administrative process. Nearly all commentators on
Congress have emphasized the importance of investigations for Congress'
oversight of the executive branch and its enormous bureaucracy. 37 Indeed
the Supreme Court seemed to recognize the administrative purpose of
investigations even as it established the doctrine of legislative purpose. 38
Moreover it specifically approved that administrative role in United States v.
Watkins. 39
It might then appear unnecessary to urge the Supreme Court to do
something that it seems already to have done; that is, admit that investigations may legitimately have administrative as well as legislative (lawmaking) purposes. The difficulty is, as Marshall Dimock long ago pointed
out,40 that the Court did not recognize oversight of the executive branch
36. See BECK,

CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS

29, at 100-01, 108;

66, 181 (1959); GiFurr,

op. cit. supra note

WHrE, CITADEL 232-33 (1956).
37. See BAILEY & SAMUEL, CONGRESS AT WORx 305 (1952); BURNHAM, CONGRESS
AND THE AmRCAN TRmrnoN 233-34, 247 (1959); BuRNs, CONGRESS ON TRIAL 101
(1949); Dimock, supra note 7, at 85-116; EBERLING, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 277
(1928); Griffith, op. cit. supra note 29, at 42-44, 49, 101-02, 114-15; GROSS, THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE 136-39 (1953); RmDIcm, THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, ORGANIZATION AND ftocsoumR 25 (1949); YoUNG, THE AMEuCAN CONGRESS 187-88 (1958).
38. Both McGrain and Sinclair involved investigations of the executive branch.

39. 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
40. Dinock, supra note 7, at 27-29.
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as a distinct purpose of investigation but subsumed that activity under the
lawmaking category.
Now it is perfectly true that investigations of the behavior of administrators may on occasion have for their purpose and/or their result the
revision of the statutes under which the administrators operate. But to
concentrate on this aspect of administrative investigations would be to
miss their most important and for our purposes most significant functions.
Bureaucracy is the core of modem government.41 Both the President and
Congress recognize this fact of political life and are constantly struggling
for control of this key group. Since the bureaucratic chain of command at
least theoretically runs up to the President, the Congress is at some disadvantage in the struggle. Investigations of administrative activity are
one congressional means of offsetting Presidential possession of the high
ground. In short, congressional investigations of administrators are not so
much reflections of Congress' responsibility for passing laws as of its concem for keeping its share in the administrative, as opposed to the legis42
lative, process.
And Congress' principal bid for influence over the bureaucrats is not
legislative correction of administrative wrongdoing subsequent to its
exposure, but the exposure itself, or more frequently the threat of exposure.
For the administrator such exposure means punishment in the form of loss
of prestige for both himself and his organization and, in extreme cases, even
loss of his position and criminal prosecution. When Congressmen attempt
to impose their individual or collective wills on the bureaucrats, one of the
principal factors working for their success is the administrator's knowledge
that the activities of his organization may at some future time be subject
43
to searching and public inquisition by the men seeking to influence him.
By subsuming administrative investigations under the heading of investigations for a legislative purpose, the Supreme Court has obscured
two factors which go to the heart of its own demands for a lawmaking
and nothing but a lawmaking purpose. First of all, a category of investigations which do not have as their sole or even principal purpose the
making of laws has from the very beginning of our government been
41. See Fmuinsuc,

op. cit. supra note 34, at 37-58;

HYNEMAN,

BURErucacY

iN

A DEMOCRACY (1951).

42. The extended and bitter polemic over surrender of executive papers to Congress
in which so many Presidents have played a leading part indicates the recognition by
both sides that administrative investigations are a key factor in the continuing struggle
between Congress and the President.
43. Woodrow Wilson somewhat overstated the case: "Congress cannot control
the officers of the executive without disgracing them. Its only whip is investigation,
semi-judicial examination into comers suspected to be dirty." WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL
CovxmiEs-r 183 (Meridian ed. 1956). Bailey's case study of the Truman Committee
is particularly enlightening in this regard. See BAnLEy & SAmUEL, op. cit. supra note
37, at 294-321. See also YoUNc, op. cit. supra note 37, at 187-88.
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recognized as legitimate.44 Secondly, exposure of individual misconduct,
not in the pursuit of information necessary for making laws, but for its
own sake, has always been an integral and essential part of this category
of investigation.
Exposure is also a principal element of another type of investigation
which has traditionally been undertaken by Congress. Whether or not
45
Congress has a legitimate claim to the title "Grand Inquest of the Nation"
or possesses the "informing function" awarded it by Woodrow Wilson, 46
it has in fact always sought to make the public aware of important national
problems through investigations. 47 Congress has investigated every major
branch of the economy, a whole series of riots, scandals, and disasters, and
all of our wars except the Spanish-American. 48 It has spotlighted the
allegedly bloodthirsty practices of the merchants of death,49 the concentration of economic power,50 organized crime, juvenile delinquency5 l and
52
subversion.
It is true that the gathering of information for the purpose of making
law is often an element in the "problem" investigation and indeed sometimes the problem is identified by the amount of proposed legislation on a
given subject.53 But only the most opaque pair of legalistic dark glasses
will blot out the obvious exposure or general informing function of many
such investigations.54 Unfortunately, the public is not always interested in
problems that affect the public interest. Congress seeks to arouse that
44. The first congressional investigation, that of the St. Clair fiasco, served to
uncover the administrative failures of the War Department. EBmRLING, op. cit. supra
note 37, at 36-37. The McGrain case resulted from an investigation of suspected
malfeasance in the Justice Department. Two of the most famous investigating groups,
the Committee on the Conduct of the War and the Truman Committee, were primarily
concerned with discovering short-comings in executive direction of the war effort.
45. TAYLOR, GRA"N INQUEwST (1955).

46. WILSON, op. cit. supra note 43, at 198.
47. Wilson, like the original American users of the "Grand Inquest" tag, was
probably referring only to control of administration and not a general investigative
power over all public affairs. Furthermore, both were undoubtedly leaning heavily
on British practice with all the attendant risks of borrowing one country's experience
for use in another. Nevertheless these tags have survived and grown familiar
precisely because Congress has in fact always carried on this general information type
of investigation.
48. BuRNHAM, op. cit. supranote 37, at 223-24.
49. The Nye Committee. See McGEARY, DwEVELoPmENTS OF CONCRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE PowER 57-60, 83-84 (1940).

50. The O'Mahoney Committee (T.N.E.C.). See McGEAunY, op. cit. supra note 49,
at 41-42, 146-48.
51. The Kefauver Crime and Juvenile Delinquency Committees.
52. The investigation of subversion is not new. Spanish bribery of General Wilkerson (1810), the Burr conspiracy (1808) and John Brown's raid (1859) have all been
investigated.
53. GwF~rr, op. cit. supra note 29, at 102-03.
54. GALLOWAY, THE LEGISLATIVE PROcESS IN CONGRESS 316 (1953); BURNHAM, Op.

cit. supra note 37, at 234.
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interest through the publicity of investigation. The vast parade of repetitive witnesses before the various committees investigating subversion and.
Kefauver's who's who of gangsterdom were surely meant to expose "menaces" as well as produce legislation. Otherwise, the congressional mountain
has labored to bring forth a legislative mouse. The very investigation
which led to the introduction of the legislative purpose doctrine was designed to educate the public about a new problem, the growth of an
economic and financial structure in which the failure of a single firm
seemingly could precipitate a national depression. The "problem" investigation intimately combines lawmaking and educational or exposure.
purposes, and it is unrealistic to allow one to blind us to the other.
Indeed exposure is not always directed at public education. In fact either
administrative or problem investigations may become, at least in part, still
a third kind of nonlawmaking investigation because of the exposure
factor. We have already seen that exposure as punishment is an element
in administrative investigations. Similarly the exposure of wrongdoing in
the course of problem investigations may lead to the punishment of
individuals through public condemnation, the loss of employment and
various other social sanctions. In such instances, investigating committees
are determining whether individuals, private citizens as well as public
employees, have been guilty of misconduct, and the result of such determination is punishment of those adjudged guilty. Investigations of this
kind certainly deserve the title of judicial investigations.P
A second type of judicial investigation is that in which the committee's.
work serves as a preliminary to or integral part of actual criminal prosecution. We are not referring here to those instances in which witnesses are
later tried for contempt or perjury, although such prosecutions may in fact
be punishment for the wrongdoing which is being investigated rather than
a penalty for recalcitrance or lying. The series of investigations concerning
the Teapot Dome scandal best illustrates this second kind of judicial
phenomena. In this instance investigations were used to uncover evidence
which became the basis for criminal prosecution. The trials were followed
by more investigations based in part on matters exposed in court. These
investigations were in turn followed by more trials and finally by further
55. The proceedings of the House Un-American Activities Committee provide the
most obvious example of one kind of judicial investigation. What particular individuals
are or are not, or were or were not, communists is a key question in the committee
hearings, and those labeled communist are subject to social sanctions, sanctions whose
severity is at least in part due to the success of the committee's own public education
campaign. The first congressional investigation, that of General St. Clair, illustrates.
the same phenomena. Although the investigation in part concerned itself with administrative failings, it also examined charges of incompetence, insubordination and
conduct unbecoming an officer on the part of the General. As such the committee
acted in lieu of a military court and substituted the sanction of public condemnation
for the normal sanctions of military law.
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investigations. The investigations were used not only to provide the
factual raw materials for prosecutions, but often to supplement the sanctions of law. In several instances where prosecutions failed, additional
investigations were undertaken to obtain punishment by public condemnation where punishment by fine and imprisonment had been avoided.50
Here it is not only impossible to separate trial from investigation, it is
equally impossible to separate the various purposes of the investigations
themselves. They provide a striking example of the combination of administrative, problem or public education, and judicial purposes.
Finally, there is one purpose of investigations which might be called
legislative in the broadest sense because it involves the legislature rather
than legislation. We have already noted the President's ability to reach and
influence public opinion through such dramatic devices as the press conference and the nationally televised speech. Congress' lawmaking activities
do not provide it with any similar capacity. Its investigative activities do.
It can hardly be a coincidence that the tempo of investigation has quickened as Presidential activity and prestige have increased.5 7 Nor, in this
light, is it surprising that Congress has plunged so enthusiastically into
investigating the menace of international communism when the nation's
preoccupation with Soviet threats has continually strengthened the prestige
of that branch of government which claims primacy in the area of international relations. Investigations have served as an important means of
bolstering Congress vis-h-vis the President in the continuous political
struggle for public attention which the President so often seems to be
winning.
Congressional investigations are then multi-purpose tools. Those purposes-lawmaking, administrative, educational, judicial and self-preservative
-closely parallel the general functions of Congress. This parallelism indicates that in practice Congress has not conceived of the investigation as
simply a scoop for gathering the raw materials of legislation, but as a
flexible political device which may be utilized to implement any or all of
the aims of Congress.
In this discussion of the realities of congressional investigation, no distinction has so far been made between the purposes of Congress in
employing investigations and the purposes of the investigators in pursuing
them. Such a distinction is, however, essential. Since Woodrow Wilson
warned that Congress was the prisoner of its committees,5 it has become a
truism that the standing committees are independent centers of power
56.

See WEANER & STARR, TEAPOT Dom

(1959).

AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION 221, 223 n.3,
244; GunrrTH, CONGRESS, ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE 12, 108 (2d ed. 1956);
THE AMMUCAN CONGRESS 245-46 (1958).
58. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GovmNvENT 62-76 (Meridian ed. 1956).

57. See BuRNHAm, CONGRESS

230-31,
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largely free from restraint by Congress as a whole and indeed largely in
control of congressional business 5 9 Since the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 194660 assigns the function of investigation to all of the standing
committees, the bulk of the investigative power is wielded by semi-sovereign
entities whose purposes are their own and have no necessary connection
with the purposes of their parent bodies.
It is true that special investigating committees must seek an authorization from their house of Congress and that all committees must go to
Congress for funds to carry on investigations. But once begun, investigations tend to generate powerful popular support through their access to
the communications media, and that support is used by the committee as a
weapon to force renewal of appropriations and authorization by Congress
as a whole. Investigating committees clothe themselves in the armor of
the evil they investigate. How many congressmen can afford the risk of
being branded pro-Communist or pro-gangster as the result of opposing
the continuation of an investigation?
Furthermore, we have noted that investigations by nature are multipurpose and that the purposes are subtly and inextricably mixed. Thus
an investigation authorized by Congress for a given purpose may achieve
not only that purpose, but also two or three others. Or just enough of
Congress' purpose may be mixed in with the actual purposes of the committee to mask the committee's deviation from its parent body's intent.
Or the committee may begin by following the congressional purpose and
then, after having recruited sufficient popular support to insure its selfpreservation, change purposes entirely. Therefore, in reality the purpose of
an investigating committee can never be assumed to be that of Congress.
Whether the two actually correspond is a matter which must be factually
determined in each instance.
Thus it would appear that the whole paraphernalia of legislative purpose
and its presumption is in fact at odds with the realities of congressional
inquiry. The problems resulting from the creation of such a judicial nevernever land are reflected in the recent investigation cases.
IV. THE Vicious CmcrE: WATIINS TO WM.n=SON
At the height of the furor over communism, and at a time when the
dangers of investigations were being widely recognized, the Supreme Court
issued an opinion in Watkins v. United States61 which seemed to challenge
i

59. See BusrNs, CONGRESS ON TmIAL 54-55 (1949); GiRnFrrH, CONGRESS, ITs CONTEMoRARY Ror.y 50, 158 (2d ed. 1956); Gaoss, THE LEGISLATIrE STRUGGLE: A
STuDY IN SOCIAL COMBAT (1953);

MATHEWS, THE U.S. SENATOR AND His WORLD

147-76 (1960).
60. 60 Stat. 831-32; 2 U.S.C. § 190b (1958).
61. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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many of the protections which the Court had previously constructed for
the investigators. The Chief Justice emphasized the potential danger of
exposure by investigation to Bill of Bights freedomso and stated that "the
mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the
face of the Bill of Rights."6 The opinion noted the "possibility that
the committee's specific actions are not in conformity with the will of the
parent House of Congress" 64 and concluded that "the preliminary control
of the [House Un-American Activities] Committee exercised by the House
of Representatives is slight or non-existent."5 Justice Warren spoke of the
"wide gulf between the responsibility for the use of investigative power
and the actual exercise of that power"6 and of committee activity which
"can lead to ruthless exposure of private lives in order to gather data that
67
is neither desired by the Congress nor useful to it."
Furthermore, when speaking of the necessary balance between public
purpose and private right, Warren insists that the Court cannot automatically assume that every investigation fulfills a public need which
overbalances any private right affected.6 8 And there is a rejection, albeit a
rather vague one, of the government's contention "that if there is any legislative purpose which might have been furthered by the kind of disclosure
sought, the witness must be punished for withholding it."69
In short, the Chief Justice strikes at both the committee and general
presumption of legislative purpose. Nevertheless, much of the old approach
is left. The investigatory power is traced to Congress' lawmaldng function.70 The separation of powers doctrine in the usual guise of Congress
makes law, the Executive and judiciary enforce it, is invoked to forbid
investigations which seek to "punish" those investigatedY No real challenge to the legislative purpose of Congress as a whole is made since the
Court can reach desired conclusions simply by making the committee the
villain of the piece. "The motives of committee members" are held not to
vitiate the Congress' legislative purpose.7 2 The result of this continued
judicial conservatism can be seen in the last part of the Watkins opinion,
which is quite distinct from that which precedes it and contains the actual
holding in case. In this final section the Court retreats from all the grand
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 198 (citing United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953)).
Id. at 201.
Id. at 203-04.

66. Id. at 205.
67. Ibid.

68.
69.
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71.
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challenges issued earlier and simply requires that a witness be given some
indication of why a given question is pertinent before he risks imprisonment by refusing to answer.7 3 This reduces his protection and the Court's
role of supervision to an insistence that the authorizing resolution or some
facet of the hearing itself indicate the investigation's purpose with sufficient
clarity to allow a judgment about the pertinency of specific questions.
Watkins is freed not because the investigation threatens his basic constitutional rights or lacks a legitimate purpose, but because certain procedural niceties were not observed.7 4
If the latter part of Watkins ignores the several challenges to Congress
offered in its introductory sections, Barenblatt v. United States7 5 signals
a step by step retreat to the pre-Watkins position of the Court. Justice
Harlan imports the "gloss of legislative history' 6 to cover over the
vagueness of the House Un-American Activities Committee's authorizing
resolution 77 which had been attacked in Watkins. For Warrens hints that
the Court might look to what was really going on in security investigations,
Harlan substitutes the standard patriotic condemnation of the dangers of
communism.78 A fairy story of St. Congress and the Red Dragon coupled
with the standard plea of judicial obtuseness in the face of congressional
power79 puts the realities of investigations entirely beyond the reach of the
Court. Then from the Watkins suggestion of a real balancing of interests
we return to the usual semi-automatic balancing act of the judicially
modest. The whole weight of Congress' general power to legislate on
internal security is thrown into one side of the scale, the particular loss
of personal rights to the one individual being investigated is placed on the
other, and the result is a foregone conclusion.8 °
The case is actually decided by reference to the latter portion of Watkins.
Justice Harlan suddenly becomes the political realist and goes over the
73. The criminal
pertinent questions.

contempt statute specifies punishment for failure to answer
To avoid unconstitutional vagueness in the- application of a

criminal statute, the witness must be able to judge whether he is refusing to answer a
pertinent or nonpertinent question.

74. On the Court's general tendency to decide cases on procedural rather than
constitutional grounds see ParrcHrr, THE PoLrmcA. OFFm-DER Am THE WAmwRn
CouRT (1958) and the series of articles by McCloskey: 42 VA. L. RBv. 735 (1956);
43 VA. L. REv. 803 (1957); 44 VA. L. llnv. 1029 (1958). Kalven, Mr. Alex-

ander Meiklejohn and the Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 315, 329 (1960)
speculates that the two parts of the Watkins decision when read together constitute a
plea to Congress to rein in its committees and a threat to act if Congress does not.
But he concludes that Congress paid no attention to the plea and the Court has
backed down on the threat.
75. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
76. Id. at 109, 117-20.
77. Standing Rule XI of the House of Representatives.

78. Id. at 127-29.
79. Id. at 132-33.
80. Id. at 134. See also Black's dissent at 144-45.
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committee sessions with a fine tooth comb finding sufficient statements;
questions, and testimony to show that the witness must have known
enough of the purpose of the investigation to make a reasonable judgment
as to the pertinency of the questions asked him.
The foundation of this decision is a further revitalization of preWatkins doctrines. Barenblatt reasserts the need for legislative purpose in
terms of lawmaking purpose 8' and makes the required bow to the traditional version of the separation of powers doctrine.82 Thus its major
premises are precisely the same as those of Watkins. But Justice Harlan's
principal task is to bolster up the doctrine of presumption weakened in
Watkins. The formal doctrine of presumption which frankly refused to
look at reality is abandoned. Barenblatt introduces the doctrine of presumption, new style. The foundation of the new style is an elaborate play
on words. The Court first requires Congress to have a legislative purpose
for investigation. It then argues that investigations are a useful and often
essential means to the end of lawmaking. Thus investigation is within
the scope of Congress' constitutional powers. 83 Then "so long as Congress
acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the judiciary lacks authority
to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that
power." The Court will not look at the actual motives behind a given

inquiry.8
Now since it is the motive of Congress, i.e., whether it had a legislative
purpose, which determines whether the investigation is actually within
its constitutional powers, how can judicial examination of its motives be
barred by an assertion of its constitutional powers? In fact what the Court
is doing is asserting as a general proposition that Congress investigates for
a legislative purpose, and then on the basis of this assertion refusing to
examine whether such a purpose actually exists in specific investigations.
In other words, so long as Congress might possibly have some legislative
purpose for a given investigation, and it always might, the Court will
presume that it does in fact have such a purpose in the particular investigation being examined.
This approach takes care of the presumption for Congress as a whole.
It remains to repair the presumption for the committee. That is done by
refusing to examine the real purpose of the committee on the basis of the
language in Watkins. "[M]otives alone would not vitiate an investigation
which had been instituted by a House of Congress if that assembly's
legislative purpose is being served." 8 Used in this way, without the repeated suggestions in Watkins that committees may go astray and Congress
81. Id. at 111, 127.

82. Id. at 111-12.
83. Id. at 127.
84. Id. at 132.
.85. Id. at 133.
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must guide them, such reasoning is just Sinclair all over again. First you
presume the "assembly's legislative purpose" and then you lean the committee carefully against this presumption in order to build it one of its
own. If the witness pleads the motives of the committee, reply with the
purpose of Congress; if he pleads the motives of Congress, reply with the
purpose, powers, motives-don't-count gambit.
The most striking feature of Barenblatt is its combination of the old
presumption game with the pretense of actually looking at the specific
investigation. "Having scrutinized this record we cannot say that the
unanimous panel of the court of appeals which first considered this case
was wrong in concluding that 'the primary purposes of the inquiry wefe
in aid of legislative processes."' Since this statement appears immediately
after Justice Harlan's refusal to look at either Congress' or the committee's
motives, i.e. purposes, it seems obvious that he "cannot say" because he
cannot really "scrutinize." The record seen through the doubly dark
glasses of congressional and committee presumption is hardly likely to
yield anything but a legitimate purpose. Thus the presumption doctrine
when combined with the facts simply yields the presumption doctrine all
over again. 86
The cases of Wilkinson v. United States87 and Braden v. United
States-8 repeat and confirm all of the Barenblatt retreats from the tentative advances of Watkins.8 Again the latter part of Watkins is employed
to send the recalcitrant witness to jail. The Court finds that statements
by the committee chairman and staff director and the committee resolution authorizing the sub-committee are sufficient to have informed
the witness of the pertinency of the questions asked.90 In both cases
first amendment claims are cavalierly rejected with a reference to the
balancing arguments in Barenblatt. Both look to the record only to the
extent that it verifies legislative purpose. Wilkinson cites the committee
resolution and statements by the chairman and staff director all of which
86. Indeed it is worth pausing briefly to examine just how the circuit court in this
case examined the record. The court first stated the presumption doctrine. Then
it examined activity of Congress in the area of subversion legislation, the committee
authorization, its annual reports which make legislative recommendations, the statements
of the chairman, etc. From these it concluded that the primary purpose of the
investigation was legislative. Then it refused to give weight to any contrary evidence
because once a legislative purpose was established other purposes could not vitiate
the investigation's legitimacy. Thus having rigorously excluded any evidence which
could rebut it, the court could triumphantly conclude that the presumption had not
been successfully rebutted. Since some pretense of legislative purpose could be
dreamed up by any committee member who is not an absolute fool, this approach in
fact establishes an irrebuttable presumption.
87. 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
88. 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
89. See 365 U.S. at 431, 432-35; 365 U.S. at 399, 407-10, 413-15.
90. 365 U.S. at 431, 433; 365 U.S. at 399, 413.
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refer to pending legislative proposals. 91 Braden rather vaguely suggests
that Barenblatt established the proposition that Congress has a legislative
purpose whenever it investigates "Communist infiltration and propaganda."92
Neither of these cases mentions the presumption doctrine as such, but
both refuse to take any account of the defendants' attempts to prove
lack of purpose. The defendants sought to show that whatever the purpose
of Congress as a whole or the general purpose of the House Un-American
Activities Committee, the specific purpose in calling them as witnesses was
not to gain information on pending legislation, but to expose them to
public censure because they had criticized the activities of the Committee.
In Wilkinson the Court replied that the circumstances described by the
witness "do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the subcommittee's
intent was personal persecution of the petitioner."9 3 Justice Stewart then
went on to use the Watkins-Barenblatt doctrine that the sub-committee's
"motives alone would not vitiate an investigation which had been instituted
by a House of Congress if the assembly's legislative purpose is being
served."94 Braden simply brushes aside the defendant's argument as to
specific purpose on the grounds that investigation of the Communist Party
of which the defendant was a member "was surely not constitutionally
beyond the reach of the subcommittee's inquiry."95
These two opinions are simply the presumption doctrine in new guise.
There is no weighing of evidence for and against legislative purpose.
Unless evidence "necessarily" leads to the conclusion of lack of committee
purpose, it will not be given any weight at all. And even if it did
necessarily lead to such a conclusion, it apparently still would be given no
weight as long as Congress' purpose was legislative, since in such instances,
committee motives don't count. Braden wraps it all up by suggesting that
as long as the subject in general is one which might have been investigated
for a legislative purpose, the Court does not96care what the committee's
actual purpose was in the specific instance.
V. A NEw APPROAcH: ABANDONING PuRPosE AND PREsUMnON
The cycle of cases just discussed has left the House Un-American Activities Committee and its fellows substantially free from any outside
91. 365 U.S. at 399, 408-10.
92. 365 U.S. at 431, 435.
93. 365 U.S. at 399, 411.
94. Id. at 412.
95. 365 U.S. at 431, 435.
96. Similar techniques which purport to look at the record have been used in several
circuit court cases since Barenblatt. See United States v. Yellin, 287 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.
1961), cert. granted, 82 Sup. Ct. 84 (1961); Liveright v. United States, 280 F.2d 708
(D.C. Cir. 1960); Gojack v. United States, 280 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Davis v.
United States, 269 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1959).
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control at the very time when public sympathy for its victims and distrust
of its methods has begun to reviveP7 Paradoxically, the Supreme Court has
placed itself in the position of protecting investigating committees precisely
because it seeks to maintain the theoretically very strict limitations on
committees imposed by the legislative purpose requirement. Since this
requirement is absolutely out of harmony with political reality, the Court
would have to strike down all investigations if it realistically examined
them for legislative and nothing but legislative purpose. Instead it must
turn to the presumption doctrine in order to inject the legislative purpose
which it requires but is not there. Thus, having asked for too much, the
Court gets nothing. It cannot use the purpose requirement to overturn
investigations it does not like because to do so would lead to a general assault on all investigations including the ones it does like. Therefore, it
cannot really use the purpose requirement at all.
But the result is that whenever the Court considers limiting investigations, it faces the prospect of having to limit the most important and wide
ranging power of Congress, the power of legislation with which the Court
itself has impregnated the investigating committees by strictly artificial
insemination. It is, of course, not impossible to impose constitutional limitations on lawmaking activity. But once law is injected into the matter for
judicial consideration, whole hosts of the judicially modest arise to protest
judicial interference with the sovereign will of the people embodied in the
lawmaking of Congress.9 Thus the requirement of legislative purpose leads
to the presumption of legislative purpose. And the presumption of legislative purpose leads to the presumption of constitutionality with which
the modest endow congressional lawmaking.99 As a result, congressional
investigations, wrapped in the double armor of these interdependent presumptions, rest safe from most lines of judicial attack.
By doing away with the requirement of legislative purpose, the Court
would place itself in a much stronger position. For instance, acknowledgment of the administrative purpose of many committee inquiries would
allow the Court to avoid the appearance of acting in defiance of the
lawmaking powers of Congress. Instead the Court would be acting as a
referee between the Congress and the Executive in an area where their
claims of constitutional power conflict. This is surely a role the modest
could approve. 10 Similarly, by looking the judicial purposes of certain
97. See DoNNRa, THE UN-AMxatcAs (1961).

98. The bible of the modest has become

HAND,

THE BILL OF
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where the position is clearly and forcefully stated.
99. The preferred position doctrine which would deny this presumption to laws
touching on Bill of Rights freedoms is currently in hibernation. It may be found
sleeping in the dissents of the "liberal" four, Black, Douglas, Brennan and Warren.
See MAsoN, THE Sunxr x CouRT From T=FT To WAnREN 146-47, 183 (1958).
100. See HAND, Tim BmL OF RIGrrs 14-15, 29-30 (1958).
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investigations straight in the face, the Court could claim the right to
impose strict supervision over those matters in which judges are admitted
to have special competence and a special grant of constitutional power.
Most important, by acknowledging that exposure for exposure's sake
has always been one of the purposes of investigation, the Court would be
in a position to point out the perils of exposure investigations and to limit
their invasion of constitutional rights. The Justices could break out of the
vicious circle of condemning exposure per se, then having to presume
legislative purpose in order to avoid striking down all investigations in
which exposure is an element, and thus in the end completely barring
themselves from protecting constitutional rights against exposure precisely
because they so roundly condemned it in the first place. Having admitted
exposure as one of the routine functions of investigation, the Court will be
free to actually look at congressional exposure and determine whether, in
specific instances, exposure has invaded the constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms of specific individuals.
The whole technique of balancing individual freedoms against society's
interests in government activities interfering with those freedoms would
greatly benefit from the abandonment of the demand for and presumption
of legislative purpose. If balancing always begins by throwing the whole
lawmaking power of Congress on one side of the scale, particularly the
power to legislate in the interest of national security, the individual rights
invaded by investigation must almost always come up light. The actual
purposes of investigations frequently do not carry nearly so heavy a weight
of social interest. Conversely, the exposure purpose of many inquiries
presents a particularly grave danger to freedom of speech and association.101
By recognizing exposure as a normal purpose of investigations, while at the
same time stressing its potential danger to individual rights, the Court
could begin to act as a real balancer of interests, striking down those
inquiries which needlessly destroy constitutional liberties and upholding
those in which exposure of some danger or misdeed is essential to our
society.
Barenblatt et al show how a presumption that the committee's purpose
is that of Congress as a whole peculiarly distorts judicial balancing. For
this presumption poses a wholly unnecessary dilemma to the modest by
confronting them with the whole weight of Congress when in reality it is
only the committee they face. The doctrine of judicial modesty is principally based on the belief in democratic responsibility. The Congress is
directly responsible to the voters, the Court is not. Thus the Court must
yield to Congress as the sovereign voice of the people. But the committees
101. The Court has recognized the danger of exposure in other areas. See Talley

v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), 14 VAND L. Rxv. 392 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama
ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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are not Congress and they do not always yield to the voice of congressional
control. As we have already noted the committees act as largely independent domains. When the Court yields to a committee, it pays homage
not to the legitimate sovereign, but to one of his unruly barons. It is, I
think, significant that one of the few instances in which Justice Frankfurter
has been willing to directly challenge congressional activity occurred when
he departed from the presumption doctrine sufficiently to find a discrepancy
between the purpose of Congress and that of one of its committees. 10'
Furthermore, judicial modesty is based on a calculation of the relative
political power of Congress and the Supreme Court. Not only are the
committes taken individually less powerful on the national scene than
Congress as a whole, but the Court can often count on at least clandestine
support from important elements of Congress when it takes on a committee.
Many congressmen who initially may not care actively to attack a given
investigation would be glad passively to accept or even support a Court
decision against the committee based on its failure to abide by the intentions of Congress. This is not to argue that the Justices may attack any
investigating committee at any time under any circumstances. But it is to
suggest that the Court may on occasion count on a favorable constellation
of political forces for the protection of civil liberties against committee
action. In short, abandoning the presumption of committee legislative
purpose would mean that in certain insiances the power of the Court
could actually be used not only to defend civil liberties, but to increase
democratic responsibility by strengthening congressional control over its
own committees.
The very paradox built into the legislative purpose doctrine may prove
particularly convenient for a Court trying to get rid of it. Just as the
requirement of legislative purpose imposes such a severe limitation on
congressional activity that it in fact imposes no limitation, the elimination
of the requirement will, on its face, free the Congress from an onerous
judicial supervision while actually giving the Court more maneuvering
room. For when the demand for legislative purpose goes, the need for
presumption of such purpose goes with it. Congress is told that it may
investigate for any purpose it sees fit, i.e. that it may do with the Court's
imprimatur what it has been doing all along without it; and the Court is
freed to begin real supervision of an area from which it has previously
been barred by its own misreading of the political scene. The grant of
additional powers to Congress nicely sugar-coats the extension of Supreme
103
Court activity.

102. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
103. Readers will undoubtedly sense the ghost of Courts past in this passage.
The technique suggested here is, of course, modeled on that of Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) in which the very large pill of judicial review was
sweetened by the Court's self-denial of certain powers which it could not in terms of
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A similar difficulty in the Court's initial approach to the purpose issue
can aid the Court in escaping the doctrine without seeming to do so. Of
course nothing prevents the Court from flatly overruling both the purpose

and presumption doctrines. It has recently provided us with a dramatic
example of the reversal of two long-standing but unrealistic rules.104 But
if the Court prefers a more subtle approach, the very ambiguity of the
word "legislative" introduced in Kilbourn may prove extremely useful. A
gradual transition from 'lawmaking" purpose to "Congress' purpose" can

be accomplished simply by progressively approving more and more nonlawmaking congressional activities under cover of the ambiguity of "legislative."
In fact there is already sufficient careless wording 105 in earlier opinions
to start the ball rolling.
ETihe indispensable "informing function of Congress" is not to be mini-

mized ....106
The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is . . . broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed
or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic
or political system . . . . It comprehends probes . . . of the Federal Government
10 7
to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.

By continuing this process, the. Court could eventually acknowledge all
of the real purposes of investigations while, at least in the transitional
stage, holding firm to the comfort of the traditional verbal formula.
Since the Court is likely to continue to get a fairly steady stream of
contempt cases, this process of change could be begun at any time.
Sentiment in favor of more active judicial supervision of at least some
kinds of investigations has existed on the Court for some time.1 8 It may
be argued that the extremely modest Frankfurter-Harlan wing of the
Court will block any such extension of judicial review. But I have tried to
show that abandonment of the purpose-presumption rationale can be
harmonized with their views.10 9 Furthermore, abandonment of the trapolitical reality hope to exercise anyway.
104. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Mapp v. Ohio, 81 Sup. Ct.
1684 (1961). The Court could then derive Congress' power of investigation from its power
to organize itself and/or from the historically sanctioned inherent powers of legislative
bodies transmitted to Congress by the general grant of legislative power in article I.
105. Careless because the opinions themselves are actually grounded on the nothingbut-the-law approach.
106. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 43 (1953).
107. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
108. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); the dissents in Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399
(1961); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); and the majority opinion in
Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
109. Note that Frankfurter did go far toward abandoning at least part of the presumption doctrine in the Rumely case.
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ditional position need not come today or tomorrow and changes in the

Court's personnel may create a more favorable market for the arguments
offered here. Indeed any current writing about the Court must be done
against the background of great uncertainty and, therefore, hope about its
collective attitude in the next few years.
There are, of course, two assumptions underlying this article. The first
is that congressional investigations have invaded the rights of free speech
and association protected by the Constitution. The second is that the
Supreme Court should attempt to protect such rights against invasion.
Neither proposition is self-evident. And it would take another discussion
of this length to offer sufficient evidence in support of either. It would
be enough, I think, simply to say that the arguments presented here are
meant for those readers who share my assumptions. But it is possible to go
one small step further. Most persons who have not been totally blinded
by the "red menace" must surely admit that investigations have done some
damage to civil rights even if the question of whether they have done
more harm than good must remain open. The abandonment of the purposepresumption rationale is designed to allow the Court sufficient flexibility
to continue its general approval of investigations while occasionally, and on
a case by case basis, limiting some of their worst abuses.
As to the Court's responsibility for protecting the Bill of Rights, there
is surely a hard core of opinion which staunchly demands complete
judicial passivism. But the Supreme Court, even in the person of its most
modest member, has never gone so far." 0 The position I have advocated
does not involve the Court in any of these abstract formulas or rigid rules
which are anathema to the modest."' Indeed it gets rid of a couple. And
it allows the Court to set its own pace and limits in protecting civil rights
so that the argument does not depend on acknowledgment of any specific
level of judicial activity.
Finally, whatever one's assumptions about investigations and the civil
rights functions of the Supreme Court, it seems desirable that the Court
do whatever it does clearly and realistically instead of involving itself in
the maze of fantasy and chop-logic which the demand for legislative
purpose and the resulting presumption doctrine have created.
110. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
111. See Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 HAlv. L. lRv.
357 (1949).

